legal insights
ssembly Bill 715, effective Jan. 1, 2026, has the stated goal of promoting educational equity and preventing antisemitism in California schools. According to the uncodified legislative intent, its passage was prompted by reports of a widespread surge in antisemitism discrimination, harassment and bullying. The bill was immediately challenged in court on the grounds that it violated the First and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution. However, in a ruling that demonstrates the very nuanced nature of speech claims, the court ruled that AB 715 meets constitutional muster.
Education Code Section 220 — which prohibits any person from being subjected to unlawful discrimination in any program or activity conducted by an educational institution on the basis of disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion and other characteristics — was added in 1982. Education Code Section 262.3, which provides for a complaint process, including an appeal of a local educational agency’s action to the California Department of Education, was added in 1988.
Over the years, California has also maintained a pattern of revising its statutes to strengthen or expand its anti-discrimination laws to protect otherwise unprotected individuals. Recent efforts included the passage of Assembly Bill 537 in 2000 (California Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act), which added sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected characteristics, and the FAIR [Fair, Accurate, Inclusive, Respectful] Education Act in 2011, which mandated the inclusion of historical contributions of LGBTQ+ and individuals with disabilities in social studies curricula for K-12.
Among its many provisions, AB 715 establishes a state Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and requires the employment of an antisemitism prevention coordinator; extends the prohibition against the adoption of instructional materials that promote discriminatory bias to professional development materials; and requires LEAs to investigate and remediate the use of such materials when they know or have reason to know that such materials have been used. Additionally, AB 715 now requires teacher instruction, not just adopted instructional materials, to be factually accurate, aligned with the adopted curriculum and standards, and consistent with accepted standards of professional responsibility, rather than be based on “advocacy, personal opinion, bias, or partisanship.” This last provision is the subject of ongoing litigation and formed the basis for a pre-enforcement legal challenge that could have blocked the law from taking effect on Jan. 1, 2026, had the judge granted a plaintiff motion for preliminary injunction (PI) in the case involved.
In Andrea Prichett, et al. v. Rob Bonta, et al., a group of teachers and students filed a complaint in federal court on Nov. 2, 2025, challenging AB 715. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for PI to enjoin the enforcement of AB 715, alleging that it was unconstitutional under the 14th and First amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
According to plaintiffs, the law’s ambiguity as to what constitutes antisemitism would give room for arbitrary enforcement and result in self-censorship among educators in violation of the First Amendment. As stated in the filings, plaintiffs worried that, in light of AB 715’s new requirement for teachers to provide “factually accurate” information, teacher plaintiffs could be exposed to disciplinary action for presenting critical perspectives on controversial topics, including in any discourse related to Israel, Palestine and the Middle East. The plaintiffs’ motion for PI claimed that AB 715 “is facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague and under the First Amendment because it is overbroad and imposes unreasonable viewpoint-based restrictions on Teacher Plaintiffs’ speech and Student Plaintiffs’ rights to speak and receive information.” The judge denied the PI motion after a thorough analysis of plaintiffs’ First and 14th amendment claims.
In determining whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, the judge considered the issue of “standing” of the teacher plaintiffs and the student plaintiffs separately, as well as whether the claims were “ripe” for adjudication. Regarding standing to sue, the judge found that teacher plaintiffs had standing under the First and 14th amendments, but that student plaintiffs lacked standing to support their only claim that AB 715 interferes with their First Amendment right “to be exposed to the broad spectrum of viewpoints regarding Israel and Palestine.” While acknowledging that student plaintiffs do have such a right under the First Amendment, the court found that they did not show an injury-in-fact, a critical element of demonstrating standing.
The judge then considered whether teacher plaintiffs’ claims were ripe for adjudication. Pointing to the record before the court, the judge concluded that teacher plaintiffs’ claims were not ripe, as “crucial aspects of AB 715 are still in motion and not fit for review.” The judge went even further to provide an insight into how they might ultimately rule in the case. Drawing on established judicial precedent, they explained on teacher plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, that teachers, as employees of LEAs are required to teach government prescribed or regulated curricula and so do not have a First Amendment right while teaching. Thus, the judge found that teacher plaintiffs could not bring a claim to “assert the violation of a constitutional right to which they have no ‘legitimate claim of entitlement.’”
Finally, considering the teacher plaintiffs’ claim that AB 715 was unconstitutionally vague for its lack of a definition of “antisemitism” and thus failed to provide fair notice of what is prohibited, the judge determined that the lack of a definition of “antisemitism” did not render the entire statute unconstitutionally vague. The judge stated that, since the United States National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism, which AB 715 references, affirms that antisemitic discrimination may be classified as discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin, or ethnicity or some combination those characteristics, any “reasonable person reading AB 715 would sufficiently understand what the legislature meant by the word ‘antisemitism.’” By inference, this would suggest that “antisemitism discrimination,” as prohibited by AB 715, is nothing more than discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin or ethnicity, all of which had been prohibited under California’s antidiscrimination laws that existed prior to AB 715.
Plaintiffs initially appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but have since dropped the appeal and in late January 2026, State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond formally moved to have the remaining claims dismissed. In effect, regardless of how it is characterized — whether as an antisemitism piece of legislation or as an anti-discrimination law — AB 715 is the law of the land and LEAs are required to implement it.
CSBA Governance and Policy Technology Services has updated affected sample board policies and administrative regulations to reflect the new provisions. If you have any questions about AB 715, please contact CSBA’s District and County Office of Education Legal Services at legalservices@csba.org or district legal counsel.